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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOTT
TION,

COPPEB

COEPOEA-

Plaintiff and Appellant,
— vs.—
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent,
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Intervenor and Respondent.

Case
No. 7639

PETITION FOE EEHEAEING

Comes now appellant and petitions the court for a
rehearing herein for the following reasons :
1. The majority has erred in failing to apply the
provisions of Section 80-5-56, Utah Code Annotated.
2. The court has erred in failing to apply as the
alternative the provisions of Section 80-3-1 (5), Utah
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Code Annotated, and instead has substituted its own concept of value for tax purposes.
C. C. PARSONS
A. D.MOFFAT
CALVIN A. BEHLE
Attorneys for Appellant and
Plaintiff.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Having conceded Kennecott's point that there is no
"market value" for appellant's tailings pond lands, this
court was confronted with an election between the two
applicable legislative mandates: (a) the assessment must
be nominal under Section 80-3-1 (5); or (b) the $5.00 per
acre rule for mines under Section 80-5-56 should be held
to apply.
The latter, which counsel still submits was intended
to apply in such cases, was peremptorily dismissed on
the authority of the Tenth Circuit opinion. Reference
is made to appellant's brief on this point, to which we
can add nothing further.
However, rather than face the dilemma as would
the District Judge, and logically grant the tax reduction
as required by the only other applicable legislative mandate, the majority appears to plunge into the realm of
judicial legislation and speculation in order to sustain the
tax.
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a. It is said that should this land be condemned,
its value to Kennecott would be more than nominal. This
assumption cannot bear scrutiny, for ready reference to
the law of condemnation confronts such reasoning with
the elementary rule that if the fair market value of the
land taken was nominal, such is the measure of the award.
The majority opinion, it is respectfully submitted, confuses the value of the land itself with the severance damages and consequential damages which would result if
all or part of the tailings pond were to be taken under
the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
b. Then it is said that since it would not be fair
to Kennecott to condemn the land at nominal market
value, the land must be valued to include the severance
damage. But such damage as a part of the over-all requirement of "just compensation" is entirely apart from
the element of just compensation which is the value of
the land taken.
c. And in any event, on what basis would the
majority justify the substitution for the legislative mandate of "market value," its own concept of "just compensation"? Certainly it should not be because of any argument that neither market value — here nominal, nor
$5.00 per acre — likewise rejected, is proper for Kennecott because of its "multi-million dollar business." Tax
legislation of course applies to all taxpayers alike, but
counsel respectfully submits that the result in this case
is to apply to this taxpayer alone a standard other than
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that prescribed by either of the legislative mandates cited
above, the only two applicable statutes.
d. Finally, we invite the court's attention to the
following elementary principle as it was recently expressed in the Arizona case of State Tax Commission v.
Miami Copper Co., 246 P. 2d 871, which here should be
the guide:
In this jurisdiction we are firmly committed
to the doctrine that doubtful tax statutes should
be given a strict construction against the taxing
power, giving due regard to the expression of the
legislative intent; and that the courts will not
"strain, stretch and struggle " to uncover hidden
taxable items,, See Alvord v. State Tax Commission, 69 Ariz. 287, 213 P. 2d 363.
It is respectfully submitted that rather than to
invoke this principle, the very reverse has here been applied to the taxpayer.
We urge the court not to place its record of such
action on the books until a rehearing has afforded it the
opportunity to reconcile the law to the facts in this case.
In a delay of nearly two years since oral argument it
is suggested that the majority has made an unfortunate
and transparent error which in justice should be corrected when the matter is called to attention.
Respectfully submitted,
C. C. PARSONS
A. D.MOFFAT
CALVIN A. BEHLE
Attorneys for Appellant and

Plaintiff.
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

